Technical and Political Life of a Nuclear Rocket

by

Bruce Behrhorst

FEW technologies receive as much controversy in past development as the nuclear rocket, and its renewed interest in present plans for future development and use. It's not coincidental that space propulsion and power methods inevitably meet with reproach on both technical and political fronts. Dr. James Dewar's book, “To The End Of The Solar System” (Story of the Nuclear Rocket) examines the record and offers remedy in a way few publications have. He explains reasons behind space propulsion systems which demonstrate enormous potential, but fail to capture implementation to which further advances permit efficient power and transportation in space.

  Despite advances in recent decades, space exploration remains constrained by the laws of known physics. Chemical propelled rockets have allowed moon landings and images from across the Solar System but have reached their limit. Solar power and propulsion also has its limited range of efficiency. In 1955 the United States embarked on a heady effort to increase speed and power of rocket engines employing atomic energy. This would allow a space program of perhaps unlimited potential.

FEATURE INTERVIEW

  It is with great pleasure to introduce the author in 2004; Dr. James Dewar who has worked exclusively on nuclear affairs in the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies: The Energy Research and Development Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

BB: Doctor Dewar...Welcome to Nuclearspace.com. Your book explains the significance of the Nuclear Thermal Rocket reactor tests and you analyze the program’s scientific and economic value. You outline many mission applications for nuclear rockets, challenging the current myth that they are only for manned missions to Mars. And my favorite, an insider’s view of the cynical maneuvering, vicious attacks and double dealing that led to its closing after years of toil to prove the successful development of then Project Rover/NERVA in 1973 (present vaguely similar Project: Prometheus).

  Lastly, you provide insights into what a vigorous space nuclear program could mean for a democratization of the space program and the possibility of bringing world peace.  Could you describe some of the first Rocketeers of the past recognizing the potential value of nuclear rocket flight like Goddard, (popular space writers: HG Wells, J.Verne, Edgar Allen Poe, Cyrano de Bergerac) and the early developers of the Nuclear Rocket such as Stanislaw Ulam, Richard Feynmen, and of course Dr. Robert W. Bussard’s in his reverberating comment, “Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) superior vs. Chemical Rockets ?

JD: The early days of the program were in the 1950's. What happened in Los Alamos in '43,'44,'45 those were just speculations that people had. There was no serious work done on the NTR in the '45's to '50's time frame. The dominant purpose of the lab was to build weapons, but that didn't stop people from speculating. In the early 1950's several critical factors occurred that led to the creation of the program - uncertainty on how small the H bomb could be made, uncertainty over whether the Atlas [ICBM] could carry it and uncertainty over the Soviet nuclear and space program and the great fear of that.

  Then there was a bureaucracy set up with the nuclear aircraft program. So all of these instances were 'ripe'. Into this situation came a man, Robert W. Bussard who won the Raemer Schreiber - Roderick Spence Space Achievement Award. Bob told me he had a consuming interest since the age of seven to go to Mars, which is rather striking because he was born in 1928. That meant in 1935 he had this vision to go to Mars. At that time there was very little known about atomic energy and the thoughts of the early Rocketeers had been focused on Radium. People such as Robert Goddard, the Father of the American space program, and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the Father of the Russian space program, focused on the only element that they knew of. It wasn't till you had fission and the discovery of it in 1939 that things really started to happen. All of this led to the early 1950's when Bussard was hired by the Nuclear Aircraft Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and given a 'Q' clearance. That gave him access to the classified studies where his previous experience was with unclassified literature and this wasn't very good. It was his article published in late 1953 that sparked the entire Nuclear Rocket Program. It was read by Hungarian scientists in key places in Government and it also sparked interest at Los Alamos and at Livermore, the two US nuclear weapons laboratories. Herb York, Director of the Livermore had a personal interest in space flight. All these things happened simultaneously. Out of all this came a program in 1955 to build a Nuclear Rocket as an insurance policy in case the Atlas couldn't be built or in case they could build the H Bomb small enough so the Atlas could carry it. That really was the origin of the program...The timing was 'ripe'.

BB: During this time the two National Labs were in keen competition. Example; the Rover nickname went from Livermore to Los Alamos, name change Project Condor to Project Rover. Atomic uses for ramjet and rockets was in a state of forming development as you point out, Project Pluto ramjet went to Livermore and Rover atomic rockets went to Los Alamos.

  Could you explain for us briefly, the Chemical protagonists of the day, Eger Murphee the oil company executive and Allan Donovan who report through the AFSWP and the “Loper Report” vs. Ulam, Bradbury, and Anderson defenders of the nuclear rocket politic scene – What do you think ?

JD: Sure, let me explain the origins of the "Loper Committee". In 1956 you had the Redwing series of H bomb tests and in the Cherokee test an H bomb that was air dropped by a B-52. That proved that you could build an H bomb small enough to be carried by a bomber or missile but it also eliminated the justification for a nuclear rocket ICBM as a back-up to the Atlas. During 1956, however, there evolved a concept of a nuclear rocket being  a heavy lifter ICBM. The thought was it could carry 'super' large H bombs with yields of 10's of megatons or even larger than that or could carry a number of small 1 megaton warheads therefore - being a precursor to MIRV's. Well, to review this, the Pentagon formed the "Loper Committee" and Raemer Schreiber, the head of the program at Los Alamos, was part of that. It wasn't the fact that there were chemical men on it such as Allen Donovan, but rather this was a group of 'insiders' that included Schreiber and they all came to the conclusion that there was simply no need for the nuclear rocket heavy lifter ICBM. That was the finding that was sent to the Pentagon and the Pentagon sent it over to the AEC. But they said there might be a need in the future for a heavy lift space vehicle. That changed the mission in concept from launching things on the Soviet Union to launching heavy payloads into space.

  The origin of the of the “Chemical men” comes up with Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Democrat from New Mexico, in January 1957 where he held  a classified hearing on the program. I had that hearing declassified (I have a copy of it in my files). Here Anderson is going after Donovan and the other “Chemical men” for political reasons because he is trying to influence the AEC to award the program to Los Alamos. Anderson picks up this theme; it's the “Chemical men” who are keeping the program back, he says. He also picks it up in '58, and he picks it up in '60 when he's trying to bludgeon NASA with greater support for the program. So there is an element of politics there that you need to be aware of. The original 'Loper Committee' included Schreiber and he agreed with those findings that there was no need for a nuclear rocket as a heavy lift ICBM.

BB: I imagine that position didn't please Mr. Anderson at all.

JD: No. Politics is different from technology. Now, at the time in 1956 both Los Alamos and Livermore had nuclear rocket programs and Anderson knew you couldn't split the program, giving part of it to one lab and part to another. One lab had to be given the program and the other had to be taken out.

 Anderson wanted it in his state, at Los Alamos. And when Livermore lost out, somehow its nickname of Rover transferred to Los Alamos while the Condor nickname eventually faded

BB: Why Mr. Anderson and not someone else?

JD: This is one of the mysteries of history. If you look at Anderson he basically had a high school education. I think he had a year or half of college and that was it. But he was a superb political person. He had the instincts which all good political people must have if they're going to be successful in finding people who's judgment he trusts, listening to those people and following what they say. That was the feature that Anderson had in spades and which I think many of the current leaders lack. View this, it was in 1956 Anderson gave a speech on colonizing the Solar System. This was a year and half prior to "Sputnik". Who would you think are people talking about such things in 1956 ? Well, you had; Walt Disney and future world, the writer Arthur Clarke, and the space writer Willy Ley. Anderson may have seen some Disney movies and may have read Clarke and Ley, but the people he was talking to were Norris Bradbury, the director of Los Alamos, Stan Ulam, the co-inventor of the H-bomb, and John von Neumann, a Hungarian scientist who was key in the US atomic program. I found the speech that von Neumann made in 1955 where he mentions those themes and Anderson pick’s them up in his speeches. Anderson had the knack of finding people who had good scientific and technical judgment and he would listen to those people, he followed what they said. It was faith, cynically speaking, some may say, 'blind faith' - but that's what good politicians do, they find good people whom to trust.

BB: If Margaret Chase Smith, Republican Senator from Maine, and Mr. Anderson were the champions on the Hill for use of things nuclear in space who would be the nuclear space advocates of today in federal legislation.. Where are politicians like these now ?

JD: Well...I'm not well versed in terms of the current members of Congress, I'm certain they're there. But if you look at the current Congress and you look at the Congresses in the 1950's there's one thing lacking; there's no JCAE (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy). It did several things. First, you picked people in Congress on both sides of the aisle who are “solid citizens”, that is, people with solid reputations for integrity and judgment. Second, the JCAE had its own staff who were dedicated only to atomic energy matters. So, as it stands now, there is no JCAE and all the JCAE’s functions were scattered in different committees and subcommittees. That meant there is no real pocket of expertise. I maybe wrong...I hope I am - that's my perception.

BB: President Eisenhower circa 1958 on building a nuclear rocket…"Sounds too much like Buck Rogers!" What would you say, were contentious factor(s) in preventing nuclear space development: Loper report, Eisenhower, disagreements between national labs, Murphee & Donovan and the petrochemical interests, post NACA formed into NASA, AEC, environmentalists ? "Who" or “What” technology was, too costly ? Was it excessive secrecy toward the public and not enough democracy on space decisions with regard to the public?

JD: My own sense is all of those things may be a factor. As I sit back and think about the Nuclear Rocket, it signifies you're going to have a vastly different space program as opposed to what is currently allowed by chemical rockets. I tried to outline that in the boxed text in Chapter 17 where I speak about  the "Nuclear Continuum". When you look at the NTR, the solid core, it's going to peak some where out at above 1000sec. of Isp.  Whether it's 1000,1100,1200, one can't say. It certainly appears that you're not going to get more than 1200 Isp out of it simply because at the moment we don't have the materials that can stand the heat requirements.

  Going back to the "Continuum" thought, the 'solid core' is only one means of holding atomic fuel in the core because after that you get into 'liquid core' concepts, then going on to 'gas core' concepts and then Fusion concepts. In each step of those you increase the heat that is present to heat hydrogen so your’re getting much higher Isp's. Higher Isp's means a much greater space program. You get more power, more speed, more of everything. That's were I think NASA's thinking is some what suspect right now or at least I hope it's changing. From my vantage point they're still viewing a nuclear rocket program as a single shot application such as this Nuclear Electric for a single shot to Jupiter Icy Moons. I argue something fundamentally different, that a space program based on nuclear will be one of colonization while one based on chemical propulsion can only permit exploration.

BB: Could you explain company positioning with regard to ‘Dollar-a-year’ contracts?

JD: What you have to recognize is that the nuclear rocket program was classified throughout its existence. So, you couldn't have people in the private sector run off and get a bunch of sensitive documents and access. So, the "Dollar-a-year" contract said, Ok, we're going charge you a 'dollar' and let you have access to the technology provided you spend your own money to have your people get the required 'Q' clearances. That gave them access to the technology Los Alamos was developing. It's a means and a very useful means for government in our system of widening the base of expertise on any technology whether it be nuclear or any other field. It's the means were by the private sector can come in and compete.

BB: As long as its done under a secure fashion, a nondisclosure clause security statement ?

JD: The fall back for not doing this is for the government to do it all. That would mean you would have very large bureaucratic organizations which would have any number of inefficiencies and you would not have any competition. It would be sort of a Soviet Union system where these large organizations would each protect their own and wouldn't want to cooperate. So, what the contract system does is build a base of expertise in the private sector, in academia, in 'think tanks' all this can be brought to bare on a particular problem. So, the "Dollar-a-year" contract is only a means for private organizations access to classified data. The Government had other programs where private industry could assign its personnel at its expense to Los Alamos. You would have a person from let say, Boeing who would go down and be assigned a desk at Los Alamos. He would sit there for a year and participate in all the programs and learn the technology.

BB: Like a liaison ?

JD: Yes, then he/she would go back to his/her company to evaluate the project's worth and help that firm make a determination if it should form its own group (team) and participate in the technology. These dollar a year contracts and personnel assignments are just a few of the means by which the government uses to create a base of expertise in the private sector.

BB: From a standpoint of Rover development back then; much with regards to nuclear space politics in Washington has not changed too much - witnessed by your book the same arguments remain, am I right to assume that? Just to supplement the question. Do you think this is the same strategy employed by the present White House with President Bush’s Directive for NASA?

JD: Well...I don't know what's going on there. But I can say this, I was part of the process at various times in my career. There are interagency groups formed by the National Security Council to take fresh looks at policy in many areas. These groups include the intelligence agencies as well as any number of other agencies as appropriate. From these came what is called, "NSC Policy Documents" they go by various names: NISDEMS, NASDEMS. I'm sure they have different names now. Essentially, the documents say, this is government policy of this president for his term in office. When a new president comes in he will take a look at all of these documents and he will make the appropriate changes, so it becomes his policy.

  I will say, on this process. It's a very helpful process because it keeps the government current in what's happening not only in terms of politics on a national and international basis, but it keeps the government current in terms of what's happening in science and technology. So you're always getting fresh thought and ideas into the process; unlike the Soviet Union which had its 'Five year plans' and when they were set into motion nothing could be changed. It was somewhat rigid. So I happen to be someone who is favorable to those frequent annual or, 'every-four-year' policy reviews.

BB: Krafft Ehricke German Rocket scientist who considered nuclear rocket use once stated , “The Universe runs on nuclear energy. Space will be conquered only by manned nuclear powered vehicles.” He developed Helios/Urania concepts. Why PASC (President's Scientific Advisory Committee) critics so stubborn against the nuclear rocket throughout its development history?

JD: That's simple. PSAC under Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy’s science adviser, did not favor in any great deal spending on space. That's quite apparent from all the documents that led up to the Kennedy's lunar speech in May 1961 and it’s quite apparent from the documents afterwards. PSAC’s negativity was countered by James Webb, NASA’s administrator, and he was a master of knowing how to maneuver in Washington.

BB: I couldn't help but think while administrators at DOE, LLNL, LANL, AEC, NASA, DOD and Washington had their power play world. Meanwhile back at the “Jackass Flats" ranch personnel had fun knowing nobody in the world was duplicating their ideas or work because this was unchartered territory - am I right to point this out ?

JD:Yes. They were doing pioneering R&D (Research and Development) no one had ever done it. What happens when you do pioneering R&D is you're going with assumptions that you take from the field that you know. You begin work, you have a test, then all of a sudden you get different results, this forces you to change your assumptions. That's basically what happens when you do pioneering R&D. You're working in unchartered areas. It's as simple as when Columbus sailing west to find a route to China and all of a sudden he finds a new world. Columbus wasn't looking for a new world; he was looking for China. Then those people had to grapple with something new which wasn't part of their assumptions. That of course, led to the colonization of the Americas. It's the same for nuclear rocket R&D, you went in with certain assumptions from building chemical rocket engines because that's all you knew to do.

BB: Familiar arguments to present day political scene meaning BOB/OMB (Bureau of the Budget/Office of Management and Budget) never really gave the Rover Project much thought and was always finding ways to cut its funding. Of course, now the situation is different you have an OMB person running NASA, so I imaging there shouldn't be any problem with funding - right?

JD:There's always going to be a problem with funding for NASA because NASA is one of the few agencies in the federal government who's budget's are controllable. Another one is the Pentagon. Most of the other spending is for medicare, social security and there you can't cut those programs without it bringing a great deal of political grief. So what OMB does, what Presidents do and what Congress does is they cut programs which they can cut. That's why NASA has never been able to move beyond the space station.

It's a simple fact of life.

There has to be a different circumstance that says, Ok, we're going to change the space program by building a Nuclear Thermal Rocket because it will have a dramatic effect on the space program after it's built. You get some operational experience and we start giving it missions.

BB: I once went to a nuclear rocket exhibit recently and one of its posters said, “Not your Dad’s Nuclear Thermal Rocket”. Is this just boasting since there is only so much a solid core can render with regards to Isp that U fuels like UO2, UN, UC in all forms including cermets can efficiently burn H2 with LOX augmentation to squeeze maybe 980 -1000 Isp max. (Non-electrical greater thrust-to-weight ratio as opposed to NEP). Granted we live in the 21 century with better materials, safety, better science… Just how much improvement from Rover/NERVA have we come with NTR technology ?

JD: Don't reinvent the wheel !

BB: I'm reminded of that when you point to your nine lessons for reestablishing a program, besides lessons for program managers and the public.

JD:First, you've had eighteen years worth of knowledge and experience that went into the solid core of the B4 type - that's proven. All these other concepts that you talk about or many of them sound good on paper, but they haven't proven the core’s design, that you can hold the core to the pressure vessel without it coming out. They've proved you can do that with the B4 and it had plenty of room for growth. You can do all those things with the B4 core that people are talking about now with 'pebble beds', 'cermets' and all that sort of stuff. In essence, the solid core based on the B4 type of core has plenty of growth potential. Just because it's 1960's era technology doesn't mean it's obsolete. That's where I come out and were the old Rover/NERVA program people come out. The object of a new program should be to build something on the B4 core whether it be a NERVA type or a small engine type and get it flying. You need to be training your people in the new technology, you need to find out its strengths and its weakness and not only of the hardware, but also of the people who will fly it in missions.

  The story of the USS Nautilus (world's first Nuclear powered Submarine) is a good example here. It shows us what can happen when you build a prototype and your focus is on your management structure in getting operational data. The Nautilus was to demonstrate the technology, it was the Nautilus that led to the Poseidon submarine carrying the Polaris missile. In the late 1940's, when construction of the Nautilus started, there were no such things as Polaris missiles. The only thing they had was the Regulus missile and here the sub had to surface and fire the missile off the top of the submarine. So the key was Admiral Hyman G. Rickover who built the Nuclear Navy on the premise of getting a prototype operational and by keeping it simple and safe. He built safety into that program. That's why I can't agree with those people who say, "...We need to find a mission for the Nuclear Rocket first." That's premature, irresponsible and dangerous. You need to have people trained in new technology and you need to have a good operational sense of what a nuclear rocket, can and can't do. After you have gained operational experience with a prototype such as the Nautilus, after you have a solid management structure then and only then do you assign missions to a nuclear rocket.

BB: What did XE-Prime show?

JD: The XE Prime ran for almost 4 hours in 1969, but only for 3 minutes at full power and that was purposeful. They didn't want to run it at full power because they knew what the NERVA core could do at full power. Rather they were looking to find out different things: how could you start the thing up under different circumstances, are you able to control it in all the scenarios that you might meet in space? That's like saying, Ok, we’ve built an automobile engine and we know it will run at 75 mph down an interstate highway. That’s the full power run. But how does this engine handle in terms changing speeds from like, 20 mph to 60 mph then back down to 20 mph or for parking and idling? How does it start up when cold or hot? Those are the type of things they were trying to figure out in XE Prime and they proved NTR could be just like an automobile engine in terms of performance. This would give a lot of flexibility to a space program. Consider, for example, solid chemical engines cannot idle or change speeds. Once started, they burn until their propellants are gone. Liquid chemical engines can restart and idle and change power levels, but they do not have the high specific impulse of NTRs.

BB: Another lesson you state is a less obvious lesson. To develop the compact, ultrahigh temperature technology for electrical generation, process heat or naval propulsion applications; it makes little sense to revitalize the space program, but not do the same for other key sectors of the economy.

JD: All I'm saying, is if you restart the NTR then you should look at adapting that technology for electrical power processing, process heat or naval propulsion applications. On the face of it there might be great benefits. Your talking about something the core size of a 55 gallon drum, it would not be very expensive to build since you're talking about getting 1000 to 1500 MW out of a core the size of a 55 gallon drum. Building a plant around it is far less expensive in terms of its capital cost than a reactor core that's 20 feet cubed. You know you're just pouring much less concrete and your pressure vessel is much smaller, so it lowers cost plus its easier to guard and secure. Moreover, by operating at 1200 ^oC instead of NTR’s 2000-3000 ^oC , you may be able to adapt the technology to process heat applications for the chemical, steel,petrochemical, coal or other industries. There might be some real benefits there and this should be looked at closely in any restarted NTR effort.

BB: Recognizing international interest, provision should be made for foreign participation, provided it enhances foreign policy and national security objectives. The ‘Black art’ of fuel element design in different entities in friendly competition (Los Alamos, Y-12, Westinghouse, BWXT, Russian fuel design) maximize structural concepts from the new SNPO should follow the old SNPO. Could you explain this lesson on reestablishing a program?

JD: I'm saying several things there. First, you should form a new SNPO, a new joint office between NASA and the DOE. I say it, partly for bureaucratic reasons and partly for legal reasons because NASA has its statutes that charters the agency. That's the NASA Act of 1958. The DOE charter goes back to the atomic energy Act of 1954, as amended. That Act prescribes certain things that have to happen, if you were in possession of SNM (special nuclear material) such as uranium. So by having a joint office you merge those two legal founding Acts for each agency; it makes it easier to handle and it also makes it easier from a bureaucratic point of view to get funding. You're not doing things on an ad hoc basis through two different management chains of command. This also leads into international cooperation. NASA’s charter stipulates what NASA can and can't do in international cooperation. It's the same for the atomic energy part of the DOE. The Atomic Energy Act specifies things that the DOE can and can’t do with foreign governments in atomic energy cooperation. So you have two different charters. So what I'm saying, if there's going to be foreign cooperation whether it be with England, France, Russia or any place else, it should be done only after you have a National Security Council review where the whole government takes a look at it.

Then the Government will decide if any cooperation is in;

• Our foreign policy interests.
• Our national security interest.
• meeting statutory obligations.   

From a technological point of view the Russians seem to have done very good work on carbide fuels.

BB: Oh...Yeah, Russians know fuels quite well.

JD: So, it would be silly from a technical point of view to ignore the work the Russians have done. However, if we wanted Russians to be part of the program, that could only be done after the Government has taken a look at it and made a policy choice, that it's in the overall interest of the U.S. And more than likely, Congress would review and most probably approve any cooperation before it took place.

BB: Environmental/safety concerns should be addressed where citizens should be encouraged to monitor effluents, perhaps with private contractor and /or EPA. Participation enhances confidence in government but exclusion creates suspicion: involve university institutes and students, space advocacy groups, and environmentalists. Could you explain this lesson?

JD: I'm a firm advocate of public involvement. If you look back at the Rover/NERVA period it was classified for eighteen years of its existence. I argue that a new thermal program should find a way for the public to be involved. I talk about not only those opposed to the program because they might have good ideas that can help. I would rather have ideas factored in as soon as possible rather than later in a court suit. This goes back to Lyndon Johnson's famous comment, that he, “Would rather have people inside the tent pissing out, rather than outside the tent pissing in." I favor having students involved because you have any number of students both in High School, College and Graduate School who bring enthusiasm and interest. You have presently 10,12,15 maybe more schools around the country that offer Masters, Ph.D.'s in nuclear engineering. So, any new NTR program should have a means were you get those people involved.

When NTR takes off, you're going to find a need for trained people. So why not get them in at the undergrad or graduate level, let them see what's going on.

BB: I noticed some very interesting final points in your book. You offer the insight that program leaders should keep a diary due to important historical significance since this would be the start of a complete change in space activities. Could you elaborate for our audience Elting E. Morison's perceptive study of the "Wampanoag", key proponents were tutored in the school of 'hard knocks' ?

JD: This gets into the analysis that follows the narrative of what happened. Why did it happen? How did it happen? One school of thought that could argue this was a legislative program sponsored by the JCAE, Senator Anderson, Margaret Chase-Smith and Howard Cannon to push NASA into having a nuclear rocket program. In analyzing things then, you look for other examples; previous Congresses doing similar things. Well, Elting Morison, a historian of technology, did a marvelous little study on a steel hull ship called the "Wampanoag" that was built right after the Civil War. It had a destroyer type of hull with screw type of prop (not a paddle wheel) and a turret with guns on it. It was able to run circles around sailing ships of the time that were the principle Men-o-war. However, the person who was the proponent of the Wampanoag had no real education. He was sort of an 'outcast', learning about steam engines the hard way by working in the boiler room. If he lived now he would probably be building Harley Davidson Motorcycles. He came up with this concept and was able to push it through and had the Wampanoag built. Those who had gone through the regular channels and were serving as officers in the Navy bitterly opposed the Wampanoag. Why? Morison in his classic little study concluded the post Civil War Navy didn't like it because they had built careers and a social order around sail. So the Wampanoag was a threat to that political, social and economic order.

  So...Yes, you can make a case it was the same with the JCAE and Congress against NASA. They pushed NASA hard because it was dominated by people who built there lives around chemical rockets they didn't want to see [nukes] come in 'cause they feared it. I don't think this is a solid, case because all agencies accept change hesitatingly or stoutly resist at times. Once agencies see there's something better coming along, change often comes quite swiftly. I think NASA would have felt that way about NTR.

BB: May I quote from your book, "Post Vietnam Congresses, however, appear more concerned with perceived excesses of science and technology, hence their abolishment of the JCAE and the space committees; they set up two often conflicting mantras: saving the environment and enhancing education. Unfortunately, when all the money spent on education produces eminent men and women of knowledge and learning, these same Congresses often ignore their voices in favor of those with theatrics and camera in mind who profess to save the environment." How do you feel about this?

JD: I think that's true. You have many notable people who go up to testify in Congress and they're testifying on any number of scientific and technical things. They give the Congressman/woman their best judgments of what plays on the Six o'clock news that is, somebody scaling a building and unfurling a banner or somebody sitting up on a tree for a year. They certainly have the right to sit in a tree for a year, but I happen to like knowledge and learning. I want to see some solid basis for any judgment a person makes; not something solely based on emotion.

BB: Finally last question. Your thoughts on how this nuclear paradigm shift in space would mean to world peace in light of recent Mars findings?

JD: This book is the first of which is going to be a trilogy on the nuclear rocket program. The second book of which I'm thinking about, but I really haven't started to write yet. It's going to deal with a far greater political justification for the program. In that book I'm going to take up thoughts of how the nuclear rocket can bring world peace.

  This is not my comment as you know. It goes back to Leo Szilard in 1932. He was the first one to make a statement to that effect and other famous scientists in the succeeding years have mentioned certain similar thoughts. Hans Bethe in 1960 made a similar comment, Freeman Dyson in 1997 published a similar comment. What I'm going to try and do is hang some meat on the bones of that comment to see how it can be done. Now, I don't see how water on Mars will have a great deal to do with it; I could be wrong.

BB: Essentially, it's quest for human survival a choice humanity would need to make. If you're occupied in aiding humanity's Solar System colonalization efforts then peoples on Earth wouldn't be fighting one another as much.

JD: Let's just say, I haven't thought it out well enough to offer any comment one way or the other. All I know is that certain people who are much smarter than I have made the statement that it would bring world peace. In a modest way I plan to give it some thoughts on how that might be achieved.

THE NUCLEAR CONTINUUM

In closing this interview Dr. Dewar left with me this parting comment.

JD: If you build a thermal rocket based on a Rover/NERVA. You would build it according to what people thought they could do in 1971-'72. That is, it would have 825 seconds of Isp it would have power densities of 1500 megawatts for the NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application), 400 MW for the small engine (Pewee) of 1972. Both would have 10 hours of fuel lifetime with 60 stop & starts had an Isp of 825  and 875 for the small engine. What I'm arguing in the text is if you had kept on working that core you would now have a 4th generation system. And it would have Isp's over 1000, power densities 3000 MW for a NERVA type of core or 800 MW for a Pewee type of core. And maybe 30 hours of engine lifetime with 180 stop & starts.

  The key thing here is NASA to my knowledge has never done any mission studies on what an engine with 10 hours of engine life with 60 stops & starts means. If they haven't done it for 10 hours, it certainly hasn't done it for 20 hours or 30 hours of operation. That's a very critical point. What that does is forces you into thinking in terms of mission systems. You would think I've got 30 hours of engine life. How are we going to use those 30 hours of engine life for various missions? Now, let's just take it simple. Assume for mission #1 your going to plan an hour of engine operation out to whatever it could be Mars, Moon and then your bring the engine back to Earth orbit. That’s another hour. So if you have 30 hours of engine life, you're getting 15 missions out of it. Now you have to assume also, if you're coming back from Mars or the Moon or whatever you want to avoid the problem that plagues the trucking industry and that's "Deadheading" - coming back without payload.

  So, now NASA faces the problem of how to avoid "Deadheading". Do we stop as we're coming back from a planet to Geosynchronous orbit and pick up a malfunctioning satellite and then bring it back and charge a $100 million fee for the rescue operation? Or is it something else? Like returning samples from throughout the solar system. The final mission becomes interesting, one in which the NTR is disposed of because it has reached its 30 hours of operation. Here it may be sent on a trajectory out of the solar system or into an orbit where it returns to Earth hundreds of years later when its radioactivity has decayed to harmless levels. This mission becomes appealing because it can be a "Free Ride" shot since NASA by then has amortized the cost of the engine and now must dispose of the engine.

  So, this "Free Ride" shot could be dedicated to scientific academic institutions, venture startup firms, even private space groups or individual citizens. They would only have to pay for the payload and not the costs of sending that payload into orbit. NASA would take it and propellant up to LEO where both would be mated to the NTR for its last mission.

BB: What you're saying is squeeze the life out of these engines and don't dispose of them half used?

JD: Yes...

BB: That makes economic sense.

JD: What this does it forces NASA into thinking in terms of missions as a system. We're going to use this engine 10, 20, 30 hours of operational life and since we’re coming back to LEO, we must avoid the problem of "Deadheading." Then the final shot may be a “Free Ride” for parties who have hitherto been excluded from the space program because of its high costs. So, what a fourth generation NTR means is, much higher specific impulse, increased power density and longer engine life for wider participation in the space program. A democratization of the space program.

  I know many antagonists will vehemently oppose any NTR returning to LEO. If they have their way it will render all of these discussions moot. However, NASA must learn that those who are most opposed to a Nuclear Space program have only a voice in the democratic process.  They do not have a veto. Those of us who want an expansive space program also have voice.

  I think NASA by its actions has given the antagonists veto authority and ignored our voices.

Photo/graphics courtesy:

La propulsion nucléaire spatiale III. Le projet ROVER : Phoebus-Nerva-NRX

Project NERVA: Reactors.

To the End of the Solar System (Story of the Nuclear Rocket), James A. Dewar, pg.97